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EMPLOYEES TO DIRECT THE INVESTMENT OF
THEIR RETIREMENT SAVINGS
Debra A. Davis*
Workers are increasingly encouraged to select the investments in
which their retirement savings will be placed. Many in Congress and the
Executive Branch advocate the creation of personal accounts in Social
Security. As with many retirement plans, workers would be allowed to
choose the investment for the amounts allocated to them, although the
range of choices may be fairly narrow. The consequences of workers'
investment choices will affect society and their employers as well as the
individuals. The existing evidence raises questions about whether the
individuals are well-suited to handle investment of their retirement savings
when confronted with too many choices or too little understanding of
markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans pride themselves on being self-sufficient. From home
improvement to health savings accounts, Americans are evidencing a
preference for handling themselves matters that were previously managed
by professionals. This is particularly evident in the area of retirement
investing.
In the past, retirement investing was typically handled by professional
investment managers. However, there has been an increasing trend
towards allowing (and even encouraging) participants to direct the
investment of their retirement plan accounts. The primary federal statute
governing retirement plans, the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974
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(ERISA), does not require (as many plans do not) notifying participants
2
that they have the option not to direct the investment of their accounts.
Additionally, the President and many in Congress propose to allow
individuals to direct the investment of a portion of the amounts that will
provide for their Social Security benefits.
This Article examines the effect on individuals and employers of
allowing workers to direct their own investment. The second Part of this
Article discusses the manner in which individuals may be able to direct the
investment of their retirement savings through employer-provided
retirement plans as well as under the personal accounts proposals to reform
the Social Security system. The third Part analyzes the ability of
participants to successfully direct the investment of their accounts. In the
fourth Part, the Article addresses the ramifications for employers when
allowing participants to handle the investment of their accounts. Finally,
the fifth Part provides suggestions for improving our retirement system.
II. RETIREMENT BENEFITS
Typically, retirement savings are comprised of retirement plan
benefits, Social Security benefits, and personal savings and investments.
These are often referred to as the "three-legged stool" of retirement
planning, with the idea that all three of these factors are needed for a stable
income in retirement.3  This Part addresses two of the three factors:
employer-provided retirement plans and Social Security.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2002). This Article focuses on the fiduciary provisions
contained in ERISA. However, ERISA also imposes certain requirements with respect to
most employer-provided retirement plans in areas that include coverage, disclosures,
participation, vesting, and funding. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1086. It also regulates litigation
related to ERISA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109, 1113, 1132. Additionally, it addresses plan
termination. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1371.
2. The term "participant" is used in this Article to refer to both participants and
beneficiaries, as this Article primarily involves ERISA's fiduciary requirements, which refer
to both participants and beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. § 1104. ERISA defines the term
"participant" as:
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former
member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive
a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of
such employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be
eligible to receive any such benefit.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). ERISA defines the term "beneficiary" as "a person designated by a
participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a
benefit thereunder." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8).
3. Social Security Online, Agency History, Research Note #1: Origins of the Three-
Legged Stool Metaphor for Social Security (May 1996), http://www.ssa.gov/
history/stool.html.
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A. Employer-Provided Retirement Plans
Employers typically use retirement plans as a means of obtaining and
retaining employees. The manner in which retirement plan benefits have
been provided has changed significantly over the past twenty-five years.
1. Defined Benefit Plans
Historically, retirement benefits were provided through defined
benefit plans.4 Participants in defined benefit plans typically accrue
benefits based on their years of service with the employer and average
compensation. These plans are generally funded through employer
contributions and earnings on the plans' investments.
Defined benefit plans are required to meet certain minimum funding
requirements in order to ensure that the trust will have sufficient assets to
provide the level of benefits described in the plan document.5  The
minimum funding level is based on a funding method that includes
reasonable assumptions about the length of time the participants are
expected to live and the anticipated rate of return for the plan's assets.6
Other factors such as employee turnover and anticipated salary increases
may also be taken into consideration. Employers are required to make
annual contributions to satisfy these minimum funding requirements.7
Earnings can have a significant role in determining the amount an
employer must contribute to a defined benefit plan in order to satisfy the
minimum funding requirements. For example, during the bull market of
the 1990s, many employers did not need to make any contributions to their
defined benefit plans.8 However, as stock market returns have declined
over the past few years, employers have needed to make significant
contributions to their defined benefit plans in order to meet the minimum
funding requirements for these plans.
4. See PBGC, Pub. No. 1007, A Predictable, Secure Pension for Life: Defined Benefit
Plans (Jan. 2000), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/APredictableSecurePension_
forLife.pdf (explaining that nearly all of the early pension plans were defined benefit
plans).
5. See 26 U.S.C. § 412 (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (2000) (referring to minimum
funding standards).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (2000).
7. Id.
8. Roger M. Kubarych, The Next Big US Policy Issue, Council on Foreign Relations
July 24, 2003, available at http://www.cfr.org/pub6143/rogerm-kubarych/thenext_
biguspolicyissue.php.
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2. Defined Contribution Plans
Today, many employers are choosing to offer retirement benefits
through defined contribution plans. The retirement benefits provided to a
participant through a defined contribution plan are equal to the value of the
contributions, forfeitures, and investment earnings and losses allocated to
the participant's account. 9  Many defined contribution plans allow
employees to elect to defer a portion of their compensation to the plan,
known as an elective deferral. Unlike with defined benefit plans,
employers are not required to make contributions to defined contribution
plans.' o However, contributions to such plans are typically made by both
employees and employers.
The risk of investment loss is borne by participants. Investment
returns directly affect the retirement benefits received by participants."
However, the earnings for a defined contribution plan's investments
usually have no effect on the amount the employer chooses to contribute to
the plan. There is no minimum funding requirement for a defined
contribution plan, unless the plan requires employer contributions.
The number of defined contribution plans has increased significantly
over the last twenty-five years. From 1980 to 2000, defined contributions
plans have nearly doubled to 687,000 plans, while private-sector defined
benefit plans declined by nearly two-thirds to 48,000 plans. 2
Additionally, the number of defined contribution plans that allow
participants to make elective deferrals, known as 401(k) plans, has
increased substantially. An examination by the U.S. Department of Labor
(DOL) of the 1999 Annual Return/Reports of Employee Benefit Plans
revealed that 401(k) plans covered over 70% of all pension-covered
participants. 3 The study reflected that in 1999, 60% of all contributions to
defined contribution plans were made by employees."4 The assets held in
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (2000).
10. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1976).
11. This assumes that the investment loss did not result from a breach of fiduciary duty.
See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2002) (describing fiduciary duties and standard with
respect to an Employee Retirement Income Security Act).
12. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION
PLAN BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 1999 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS 75 (2004),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/1999pensionplanbulletin.pdf (indicating that from 1980 to
1999, the number of defined contribution plans increased from 340,805 to 683,100 plans,
while the number of defined benefit plans decreased from 148,096 to 49,895 plans); see also
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PRELIMINARY PRIVATE
PENSION PLAN BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 2000 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS 75 (2005).
13. PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 1999 FORM 5500 ANNUAL
REPORTS, supra note 12, at 4.
14. Id. at 3.
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401(k) plans have increased by approximately 13% per year since 1990.15
By the end of 2004, there were approximately $2.1 trillion held in 401(k)
plans.
16
3. Responsibility for Plans' Investments
The fiduciaries of both defined benefit and defined contribution plans
are responsible for managing the plans' investments. 17  ERISA section
404(a) provides that the fiduciaries for employee benefit plans are required
to discharge their duties regarding the plan: (i) solely in the interest of
participants; (ii) for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants and paying reasonable administrative expenses; (iii) using the
"care, skill, prudence and diligence" that a prudent person would use; (iv)
by diversifying the plan's investments; (v) in accordance with the plan's
documents unless they conflict with ERISA. 8 These standards are among
"'the highest known to the law."
'"19
In handling a plan's investments, fiduciaries are required to engage in
a prudent process. ERISA section 404(a)'s requirements will be satisfied if
the fiduciary has given appropriate consideration to the relevant facts and
circumstances regarding a particular investment or investment course of
action and has acted accordingly.20 In Riley v. Murdock, the court
explained:
Courts have articulated two way[s] in which to measure a
fiduciary's use of prudence in carrying out their duties. The first
is whether the fiduciary employed the appropriate methods to
diligently investigate the transaction and the second is whether
the decision ultimately made was reasonable based on the
information resulting from the investigation.2'
Courts have indicated that they will focus on whether the fiduciaries
engaged in a prudent process as opposed to the outcome of their
15. Investment Company Institute, Frequently Asked Questions About 401(k) Plans,
Sept. 2005, http://www.ici.org/home/faqs-401k.html.
16. Id. See also Eric Hazard, SPARK: 401(k) Assets Up 22% in '03, Apr. 19, 2004,
http://www.plansponsor.com/pitypel 0/?RECORDID=25083 (reporting that the
Management Report from the Society of Professional Administrators and Recordkeepers
(SPARK) shows that the assets in 401(k) plans reached $1.795 trillion in 2003).
17. 29 U.S.C. §1104(a) (2002).
18. Id.
19. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 549 (S.D.
Tex. 2003) (quoting Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1069 (1982); Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d 286, 294 (5th Cir. 2000)).
20. 29 CFR § 2550.404a-l(b)(1) (1977).
21. Riley v. Murdock, 890 F.Supp. 444, 458 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (citation omitted).
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decisions.22
The courts have made it clear that good intentions are not enough.
The court in Donovan v. Cunningham bluntly stated that fiduciaries may
not escape the reasonable man/ reasonable person standard of prudence in
making investments by having "a pure heart and an empty head.,
23
Fiduciaries can shift the responsibility for investing the assets in a
defined contribution plan. ERISA section 404(c) provides protection for
fiduciaries from losses that result from participants' exercise of control
over the investment of their retirement plan accounts if certain
requirements are met.
The regulation to ERISA section 404(c) enumerates the requirements
for fiduciaries to be afforded 404(c) protection, which can generally be
divided into four broad categories. These include: (i) affording
participants certain opportunities; (ii) satisfying disclosure requirements;
(iii) offering certain categories of investments; and (iv) refraining from
prohibited activities.24
In order to satisfy ERISA section 404(c), participants must be afforded
the opportunity to exercise control over assets in their accounts. In order
for participants to be given this opportunity, the plan must provide that the
participant has a reasonable opportunity to give investment instructions to
an identified plan fiduciary or an agent of the fiduciary.25 Additionally,
participants must be able to obtain written confirmation of their investment
instructions.26
Participants must be given sufficient information to make informed
decisions regarding the plan's investments, including an explanation that
the plan intends to comply with ERISA section 404(c) and that the
fiduciaries may be relieved of liability for losses resulting from the
participant's investment instructions.27 Furthermore, participants must be
given descriptions of: (i) the investment options offered by the plan; (ii)
the investment objectives; (iii) the "risk and return characteristics" for each
investment option; (iv) "any designated investment managers"; (v) the
circumstances under which they can give investment instructions, including
any limitations; (vi) "voting, tender and similar rights," including any
22. Laborers Nat'l Pension Fund v. Northern Trust Quantitative Advisors, Inc., 173
F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Laborers Nat'l Pension Fund v. Am. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 528 U.S. 967 (1999); Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455 (5th Cir.
1983); Springate v. Weighmasters Murphy, Inc. Money Purchase Pension Plan, 217 F.
Supp. 2d 1007, 1023 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Bevel v. Higginbottom, No. CN-98-474-X, 2001 WL
1352896 (E.D. Okla. Oct. 4, 2001).
23. Donovan, 716 F.2d at 1467.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2002).
25. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2) (1992).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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restrictions; (vii) any transaction fees and expenses which affect their
account balances; and (viii) the additional information available upon
request as well as the contact information for the plan fiduciary responsible
for providing that information. 28 The plan must also provide "a copy of the
most recent prospectus provided to the plan" if participants invest in an
option that is subject to the Securities Act of 1933, such as a mutual fund.29
Additional requirements apply for employer securities.3°
Participants must be given the option of choosing from a broad range
of investment alternatives. 3' A range of investment options is considered to
be broad if participants are reasonably able to materially affect the risk and
return of their accounts. Participants must be given at least three
designated investment options, which in the aggregate enable them to: (i)
create a portfolio with risk and return characteristics that would be
appropriate for a participant; (ii) diversify their accounts so as to minimize
the risk of large losses; and (iii) change their investment allocation at least
once every three months.32 Each of the three investment options must: (i)
be diversified; (ii) have "materially different risk and return
characteristics"; and (iii) when combined with other investments offered,
tend to minimize the risk of the participant's portfolio.33  Additional
requirements apply if participants can invest in certain options more
frequently than they can invest in the designated options.34
In order for plans to satisfy ERISA section 404(c), their fiduciaries
and plan sponsors must refrain from certain actions. Fiduciaries and plan
sponsors may not subject participants to improper influence.35 Fiduciaries
may not conceal material non-public facts regarding plan investments,
unless revealing such facts would violate federal or state law that is not
preempted by ERISA.36 Additionally, transactions involving a fiduciary
must be fair and reasonable to the participant.37
Although the regulation to ERISA section 404(c) describes the
requirements for an "ERISA section 404(c) plan," its provisions appear to
apply on a transaction-level basis. 38  For example, a plan that fails to
deliver a prospectus to one participant for one investment option would
technically fail to satisfy ERISA section 404(c) for that particular
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1) (1992).
32. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3).
33. Id.
34. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(C).
35. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(c)(2).
36. Id.
37. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(c)(3).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2).
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transaction. However, courts have yet to opine on whether every single
requirement must be satisfied in order for fiduciaries to rely on the
protection afforded by ERISA section 404(c).
Many 401(k) plans allow participants to direct the investment of their
401(k) accounts. One study revealed that 87% of 401(k) plan participants
direct the investment of all or part of their accounts.3 9 A study conducted
in 2004 reflected that 93% of plan sponsors surveyed make a statement that
the plan intends to comply with ERISA section 404(c).4 °
B. Proposed Personal Accounts in Social Security
If employer-sponsored retirement plans are the first leg of the three-
legged stool, then Social Security is the second leg. With the passage of
the Social Security Act,4' a social insurance program was created to pay
retired workers continuing income after disability or retirement.
1. Historical Approach
Since 1940, benefits have been paid as a monthly amount for the life
of the individual. 42 Retirement benefits are based in part on the worker's
average compensation. Benefits are primarily funded through explicit
43payroll taxes that are not intended to be used for any other purpose.
Payroll taxes for Social Security's retirement and disability insurance
benefits (Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, hereinafter
OASDI) are equal to 12.4% of each worker's compensation, up to $90,000
per year, for 2005. 4  The benefits that current Social Security retirees
receive are paid out of taxes collected from today's workers.45 Any money
left over from the payroll taxes withheld is credited to the Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund.46
The trust fund is invested in special issue Treasury bonds and
39. PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 1999 FORM 5500 ANNUAL
REPORTS, supra note 12, at 3.
40. DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP, DELOITTE CONSULTING 2004 ANNUAL 401(K)
BENCHMARKING SURVEY, Apr. 2005, http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/
Annual_401 k_BenchmarkingSurvey_2004%281%29.pdf.
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434 (2003).
42. Social Security Administration Home Page, Historical Development at 4 (1997),
http://www.ssa.gov/history/ pdf/histdev.pdf.
43. 26 U.S.C. § 3101 (2000); The Heritage Foundation, Social Security Basics, Web
Memo #143 (Sept. 12, 2002), http://www.heritage.org/Research/SocialSecurity/wm143.cfm.
44. Office of the Commissioner; Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for
2005, 69 Fed. Reg. 62,497, 62,499 (Oct. 26, 2004).
45. Social Security Basics, supra note 43.
46. Id.
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certificates of indebtedness. 47 The Treasury bonds can only be issued to
and redeemed by the trust fund.48  The bonds pay the same interest as
regular Treasury bonds issued on the same day and in the same maturity.49
However, when they mature the bonds are rolled over into new bonds,
which include both the original issue amount and the interest due.5°
Analysts of Social Security have concluded that the trust funds "are claims
on the Treasury that, when redeemed, will have to be financed by raising
taxes, borrowing from the public, or reducing benefits or other
expenditures."'"
The Century Foundation has undertaken an analysis of the anticipated
benefits received by workers with the taxes paid by such workers that
reflects one of the major criticisms of the current system. Using these
amounts, the Foundation calculated an estimated rate of return on workers'
"contributions" to the Social Security program. They found that a couple
with one worker who earned an average income would receive a real rate of
return of 3.75% upon turning age sixty-five in 2029.52 A single man with
low earnings who is sixty-five in 2029 can expect to have an average rate
of return of around 2.4%. 3  However, a single male with high earnings
would lose money, with a rate of return of -0.72%. 4
The Century Foundation's position and similar criticism are rejected
by opponents of personal accounts, who argue that it is important to
recognize that the Social Security system is a social insurance program,
rather than an investment vehicle. According to President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, who helped found Social Security, the Social Security program
was intended to reduce poverty among the elderly.55 Supporters assert that
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S,
Analytical Perspectives, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2000
337 (1999).
52. SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: A CENTURY FOUNDATION GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 22
(Century Foundation Press, 2002 ed.).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. The American Institute of Public Accountants Home Page, Understanding Social
Security Reform: The Issues and Alternatives, at 14-15, Mar. 2005,
http://www.aicpa.org/download/members/socsec/SOCIALSECURITYREFORM_3-
2005.pdf; Social Security Administration Home Page, Presidential Statements, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, FDR's Statements on Social Security. Radio Address on the Third Anniversary
of the Social Security Act, Aug. 15, 1938, http://www.ssa.gov/history/fdrstmts.html#radio).
President Roosevelt is quoted as stating:
The Social Security Act offers to all our citizens a workable and working
method of meeting urgent present needs and of forestalling future need. It
utilizes the familiar machinery of our Federal-State government to promote the
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this has been a major accomplishment of the Social Security system, with
poverty 35.2% lower in 2000 than it was in 1959.6 It is estimated that the
poverty rate among the elderly would be 48% if the Social Security system
did not exist and changes had not been made to the economy or other
government programs.57 Social Security payments comprise more than
90% of the income of 30% of its recipients and more than 50% of the
income for almost 60% of recipients.58
2. Personal Accounts Proposal
In December 2001, the President's Commission to Strengthen Social
Security ("Commission") recommended that Social Security be revised to
allow for voluntary personal accounts placed in private investments. 59 All
three of the alternative models for Social Security reform developed by the
Commission included voluntary personal accounts.6° Under each of the
three models, workers could voluntarily invest a percentage of their wages
in a personal account.61
President George W. Bush supports the concept of voluntary personal
accounts as recommended by the Commission. In his 2005 State of the
Union Address, the President proposed voluntary contributions to personal
accounts.62 He recommended that contribution limits be increased over
common welfare and the economic stability of the Nation.
The Act does not offer anyone, either individually or collectively, an easy
life-nor was it ever intended so to do. None of the sums of money paid out to
individuals in assistance or in insurance will spell anything approaching
abundance. But they will furnish that minimum necessity to keep a foothold;
and that is the kind of protection Americans want.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., STRENGTHENING SOCIAL
SECURITY AND CREATING PERSONAL WEALTH FOR ALL AMERICANS 13-16 (Dec. 21, 2001),
available at http://www.csss.gov/reports/Final-report.pdf. For background information on
the origins of personal accounts, see Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Private-Account Concept Grew
From Obscure Roots, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2005, at Al.
60. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., supra note 59, at 14-16.
61. Id. Under Model 1, workers could invest up to 2% of their wages. Id. at 14. Model
2 provides for an investment of up to 4% (up to $1,000 per year, indexed annually to wage
growth). Id. at 15. Model 3 creates personal accounts through "a match of part of the
payroll tax-2.5% up to $1000 annually (indexed annually for wage growth)-for any
worker who contributes an additional 1 percent of wages subject to Social Security payroll
taxes." Id. at 16.
62. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11 .html.
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time, to up to 4% of workers' payroll taxes. 63 There would be a cap on
contributions of $1000 per year in 2009, which would increase by $100 per
year plus growth in average wages. 64 The President has recommended that
workers have the ability to choose from several low-cost, broad-based
investment funds.65 Workers would be able to change their investment
allocations periodically.
66
President Bush proposes that the investment options would be similar
to the federal employee retirement program, known as the Thrift Savings
Plan (TSP).67 The investment options would be held in pooled accounts
and would be managed by private investment managers, where the
selection of the investment managers would be done through a competitive
bidding process. 68 Workers' accounts would be invested in a combination
of conservative bonds and stock funds.69
Workers would be able to invest their accounts in a small number
of very broadly diversified index funds patterned after the current
TSP funds ... [including] a safe government securities fund; an
investment-grade corporate bond index fund; a small-cap stock
index fund; a large-cap stock index fund . . . an international
stock index fund . . . [and] a government bond fund with a
guaranteed rate of return above inflation. Workers would also
have the option of choosing a "life cycle portfolio," which would
decrease the level of investment risk of the workers' accounts as
they aged.7°
Regardless of the options selected, workers' investment choices would
be automatically adjusted as they neared retirement age.7 Unless the
worker and his or her spouse specifically opted out, the account would be
automatically invested in a life cycle portfolio when the worker reached
age 47.72 The life cycle portfolio would gradually shift the allocation of
investments towards secure bonds as the individual nears retirement.73
Although the investment options initially proposed by President Bush
are limited and professionally managed, some have expressed concerns
about the ability of personal accounts to provide adequate retirement
savings. For example, Yale University economist Robert J. Shiller
63. Id.
64. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., supra note 59, at 15.
65. Bush, supra note 62.
66. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., supra note 59, at 6.
67. Bush, supra note 62.
68. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., supra note 59, at 6.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 7.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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suggests that under the President's proposal, the use of life cycle accounts
would result in workers receiving less in benefits when they use personal
accounts, instead of receiving traditional benefits under the Social Security
system.74
The President's proposal also considers allowing workers to select
from a broader range of investment options after the initial accounts reach
$5000.75 After reaching the threshold limit, the accounts could be invested
in a range of private-sector funds.76 These investment options would be
limited to funds that are "very diversified and reflect the performance of
many companies spanning all major commercial sectors. 7 7 Funds could
only impose one fee per year, expressed as a percentage of assets.78
The report of the President's Commission to Strengthen Social
Security indicates that money invested in personal accounts reduces the
amount that will be needed for future Social Security payments:
[E]very dollar invested in a personal account reduces the cost of
future Social Security payments by one dollar, plus the offset rate
of interest that is proposed for each plan (ranging from 2 percent
to 3.5 percent after inflation). Total expected benefits to the
worker are increased by the compounded difference between the
offset rate of interest for the Reform Model and the expected rate
of return earned by the personal account. So long as the personal
account earns a return higher than the offset rate, both Social
Security and the individual come out ahead.79
Both the Social Security system and workers will be in a better
position if personal accounts earn higher rates of return than the offset rate.
However, workers are likely to receive lesser Social Security benefits in the
event that the rates of return for their accounts do not exceed the offset rate.
74. Robert J. Shiller, The Life-Cycle Personal Accounts Proposal for Social Security:
An Evaluation 2, March 2005, http://www.irrationalexuberance.com/ShillerSocSec.doc.
Shiller found that "[u]sing historical returns, the life-cycle portfolio loses money 32% of the
time (i.e., 32% of the time the internal rate of return is less than the 3% real return required
to break even in the proposal)." Id. at 3. Shiller found the median rate of return to be 3.4%
annually. The study also found that the life-cycle portfolio loses money 71% of the time
when "more realistic adjusted returns" are used, with a median rate of return of 2.6%
annually. Id. David C. John, a Social Security Analyst with the Heritage Foundation,
indicated that Shiller's "more realistic adjusted returns" are not supported by other studies.
Jonathan Weisman, Retirement Accounts Questioned: Paper Challenges Expected Benefits,
WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2005, at El. Goldman Sachs economists also indicated that returns
may be lower than the 3% offset, and Jeremy J. Siegel, a finance professor at the University
of Pennsylvania's Wharton School stated, "You can't get three percent in the market
anymore." Id.
75. Assoc. Press, Bush Advisers OK Social Security Plan, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 2005.
76. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N TO STRENGTHEN SOC. SEC., supra note 59, at 46.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79 ld at 74
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Thus, the balance between affording significant personal choice and
restricting choice sufficiently to make higher returns more likely will
consume much of the debate.over personal accounts in the future.
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED INVESTMENT OF 401(k)
ACCOUNTS
A. Ability of Participants to Properly Invest Their Accounts
Many retirement experts have expressed the opinion that most
participants are not properly directing the investment of their retirement
accounts. Zvi Bodie of the Pension Research Council has stated that "[l]ike
surgery, asset allocation is a complex procedure, requiring much
knowledge and years of training. No one would imagine that patients could
perform surgery to remove their own appendices after reading an
explanation in a brochure published by a surgical equipment company.' 8°
Experts cite a variety of reasons why participants are not adequately
allocating their accounts, including inadequate diversification and over-
investment in company stock. Additionally, they note problems with the
investment options offered to participants as well as the manner in which
they are offered. However, there are conflicting results regarding the effect
on participants' rates of return.
1. Concerns Regarding Participants' Investment Selections
Numerous studies indicate that many participants are not adequately
prepared to manage the investment of their retirement accounts. A 2004
survey by the Vanguard Center for Retirement Research indicated that
although most "retirement investors" had given some thought to investing
for retirement, many did not have specific plans."1 For example, the
research revealed that "[o]nly 41% [had] a target goal for asset
accumulation. 8 2 The survey also reflected that 28% of the investors who
participated in the survey had given little or no thought to the risk of
investing in stocks in retirement.83  The 2003 National Survey of
Employers and Employees found that fewer than 30% of employees
surveyed were "confident in their ability to make the right financial
80. Zvi Bodie, An Analysis of Investment Advice to Retirement Plan Participants, 10
(Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 2002-15, 2002), available at
http://prc.wharton.upenn.edu/prc/PRC/WP/WP2002-15.pdf.
81. JOHN AMERIKS ET AL., THE VANGUARD GROUP, EXPECTATIONS FOR RETIREMENT: A
SURVEY OF RETIREMENT INVESTORS 1 (2004), https://institutional4.vanguard.com/iip/pdf/
CRRRetirementExpectations.pdf.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 5.
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decisions for themselves and their families. 84
Additionally, the manner in which many participants invest their
retirement accounts appears to be questionable. According to the
JPMorgan Retirement Plan Services 401(k) Quiz, 96% of participants
could not put investments in order from the most conservative to the most
aggressive.85 The quiz also found that only 38% correctly identified the
penalty for early withdrawals and only 47% were aware that they needed to
reallocate their assets as a result of changes in their investment goals or
time horizon.86 Other surveys have found that many participants fail to
diversify their accounts and, instead, hold only one or two investments in
their 401(k) accounts. 87 Data also indicate that many participants over-
invest in company stock.88 As discussed below, research has also indicated
that participants' opinions about the stock market are not supported by
historical data; participants tend to follow the path of least resistance and
experience information overload.
Research has found that participants' perceptions of the stock market
are often unrealistically based on historical data. Participants predicted a
63% chance that the stock market would decrease by 10% in the upcoming
year, while the historical risk of this happening is only 14%.89 They
believed that there was a 51% chance that the stock market might drop by
one-third in a given year, although the historical risk is only 2%.90 They
also estimated "a 37% chance that stocks might earn 20% per year for the
coming decade," 91 although the chance of this happening was only 1%.92
84. METLIFE, THE METLIFE STUDY OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS TRENDS: FINDINGS FROM
THE 2003 NATIONAL SURVEY OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 9 (2003),
http://www.metlife.com/WPSAssets/21038406741080074055VIFemployee%20benefit%20
trendspdf.pdf.
85. Kip McDaniel, 401(k) Participants Fail Retirement Quiz, Apr. 4, 2005,
http://www.plansponsor.com/pitype 1 Oprint.jsp?RECORDID=2892 1.
86. Id.
87. William J. Arnone, Educating Pension Plan Participants 10 (Pension Research
Council, Working Paper No. 2004-7, 2004), available at http://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/-pr
c/PRC/WP/WP2004-7.pdf ("Fidelity Investments (2003) found in one survey that a quarter
of DC plan participants held only a single investment asset in their 401 (k) plans; and Hewitt
Associates (2002) notes that 41 percent of plan participants held only one or two funds in
2002.").
88. Id. at 11 ("Other data show that more than 8 million 40 1(k) participants held more
than 20 percent of their plan assets in company stock. Overall, company stock still
dominates many pension plan accounts, averaging 42 percent of balances among
participants holding any company stock.") (citation omitted).
89. JOHN AMERIKS ET AL., supra note 81, at 14 (estimating the historical risk over the
1926-2003 period).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (indicating that the chance of an annual 20% gain over any year in a rolling ten-
year period from 1926-2003 is only 1%).
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Julie Agnew and Lisa R. Szykman of the Center for Retirement
Research at Boston College found in their research "that individuals are not
making choices that best fit their needs." 93  They indicate that there is
strong evidence suggesting that participants often make choices based on
the "path of least resistance., 94  Their report indicates that "[1literature
suggests that procrastination, the status quo bias, and anticipated regret are
all reasons for individuals' tendency to follow the path of least
resistance. ' They found that many participants utilize the plans' default
options as a result.96 They stated that "[a]ccepting the default options
defeats the purpose of a self-directed investment account and, depending on
the default options, can have an adverse affect on the participant's
savings." 97
Agnew and Szykman also studied the effects of information overload
on participants.98 They found that "[r]esearch in the decision-making
literature suggests that rather than processing more information when
decisions become more complex, consumers tend to reduce the amount of
effort they expend in order to make their decision or choice." 9' They
indicated that 80% of participants in plans that had automatic enrollment
were invested in the plan's conservative default investment fund and over
50% of these participants remained in the default fund three years later.100
Agnew and Szykman indicated that they did not consider the default
investment to be a particularly good choice for participants as this option is
"not generally optimized for the individual."' 0'1  They stated that
"investment in the default options often results in inadequate savings for
many individuals" as these tend to be conservative investment options.
1
0
2
They also indicated that the use of the default "suggests that individuals are
not carefully considering their options, which may have an adverse effect
on one's future financial security." 103
Agnew and Szykman found that participants' investment knowledge
93. Julie Agnew & Lisa R. Szykman, Asset Allocation and Information Overload: The
Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice and Investor Experience 3 (Ctr. for Ret.
Research, Working Paper No. 2004-15, 2004), available at http://www.bc.edu/centers/crr/
papers/wp_2004-15.pdf (citation omitted).
94. Id. (citation omitted).
95. Id. (citation omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id. (citation omitted).
98. See id. at 4 (reasoning that people are reluctant in making decisions about
investments within their defined contribution plans because they experience information
overload).
99. Id. (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 6.
103. Id.
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affected whether participants used the default option.'O° As expected, less
knowledgeable individuals utilized the default option more often than more
knowledgeable individuals did." 5  In one .experiment, 20% of low-
knowledge individuals used the default, compared to 2% of the high-
knowledge individuals." 6 In a second experiment, 25% of low-knowledge
individuals used the default, compared to 4% of the high-knowledge
individuals.0 7 This evidence suggests that many participants are not adept
at properly directing the investment of their retirement accounts. 108
2. Potential Problems with the Investment Choices Offered
Retirement experts have also expressed concern with respect to the
number of investment choices offered and the diversity of the options
offered, as well as the types of funds offered to participants.
Zvi Bodie of the Pension Research Council found that there has been
an increase in the last several years in the number of investment options
offered to participants. Research has reflected an increase in the average
number of funds offered from 16.7 in 2003 to 18.6 funds in 2004.'09 Larger
plans had an even higher average number of funds of 28.7 in 2004.10
Bodie expressed the concern that "if people do not have the knowledge to
make choices that are in their own best interests, increasing the number of
choices may not necessarily make them better off. In fact, it could make
them more vulnerable to exploitation by opportunistic salespeople or by
well-intentioned, but unqualified, professionals."'.
Research by Agnew and Szykman found that individuals with above-
average financial knowledge experienced fewer feelings of information
overload when there were fewer investment options. However, individuals
with below-average financial knowledge continued to feel overload
regardless of the number of investment options offered."
2
Additionally, several professors of finance studied the adequacy and
characteristics of the choices offered to 401(k) participants and found that
many plans do not offer adequate investment options. Research indicates
that 62% of 401(k) plans do not offer adequate investment choices to
104. Id. at 8-9.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 16-17.
107. Id. at 23.
108. See id. at 24 ("[T]he lack of financial knowledge in our sample raises concerns
about the public's ability to effectively manage their retirement accounts.").
109. Nevin Adams, 2004 DC Survey, PLANSPONSOR.coM, Nov. 2004.
110. Id.
111. Bodie, supra note 80, at 9.
112. Agnew & Szykman, supra note 93, at 22.
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participants.113 The research found that the plans offered an insufficient
number and type of investment options that would enable a desirable
portfolio to be created, or else offered poor-performing investment
choices. 114
There is also evidence that the manner in which investment options
are presented affects the choices made.1 5 Data gathered by the Investment
Company Institute (ICI) and Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI)
reflecting 2003 year-end amounts indicated that the options participants
were offered significantly affected how participants allocated their
accounts.1 16  ICI and EBRI compared plans that included in their
investment options guaranteed investment contracts and other stable value
funds (collectively referred to as "GICs") and/or company stock with plans
that did not include these options. The study revealed that participants in
plans that offered both GICs and company stock invested nearly 23% less
in equity funds than plans that offered neither GICs nor company stock."7
Participants in plans that offered GICs but not company stock invested 7%
less in equity funds than plans that offered neither GICs nor company
stock. 18 Thus, the study suggests that the options offered affected the
investment allocations selected by participants.
These findings suggest that participants may be subject to a number of
influences that adversely affect the manner in which they direct the
investment of their retirement accounts. These influences range from
unrealistic assessments of market risks and ignorance of market dynamics
to the presentation of investment choices that are too narrow to meet
diversification needs or too broad to permit effective analysis of the
options.
113. Edwin J. Elton et al., The Adequacy of Investment Choices Offered by 401(k) Plans
1 (Dec. 2004), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu-mgruber (follow "Research" hyperlink; then
follow "The Adequacy of Investment Choices Offered by 401K Plans" hyperlink).
114. Id. at2.
115. See Susan Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress' Misguided Decision to
Leave 401(K) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 361,
381 (2002) ("By controlling which investment options are offered in a plan, how many
options are offered, how the options are presented, and what types of disclosures about the
choices are made, employers retain significant control over employee choices."). See
generally Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kyser, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630 (1999); Mark Kelman et al.,
Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL. STUD. 287 (1996).
116. Sarah Holden & Jack VanDerhei, Appendix: Additional Figures for the EBRI/ICI
Participant-Directed Retirement Plan Data Collection Project for Year-End 2003, at 4 (Inv.
Co. Inst., Washington, D.C.) (Aug. 2004), http://www.ici.org/pdf/per0-02_appendix.pdf.
117. Id. at 6fig.A5.
118. Id.
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B. Effectiveness of Potential Solutions
As a result of the concern over participants' ability to properly direct
the investment of their retirement accounts, as well as participant demand,
many employers have offered participants investment education, advice
and life cycle funds. The effectiveness of these options has not been
clearly evidenced.
1. Investment Education
Many employers have chosen to provide investment education to
participants in their retirement plans. The DOL released guidance in 1996
that explained the types of investment information that could be provided
to participants that would not be considered investment advice. 1 9 These
include plan information, general financial and investment information,
asset allocation models, and interactive investment materials. 
20
ERISA provides that persons who provide investment advice for a fee
are fiduciaries. 21 Prior to the release of guidance, some employers had
been concerned that they would potentially have fiduciary liability for
participants' investment decisions if they provided investment information,
even if their plans complied with section 404(c) of ERISA. 2 2 As a result of
the DOL guidance, employers can provide investment education to
participants without subjecting themselves to liability for losses resulting
from participants' investment decisions, as long as the plans comply with
section 404(c) of ERISA.
Investment education is now frequently offered by employers. A 2003
survey indicated that 89% of the employers surveyed offered investment
education to employees.1 23 A report by Lipper Research Services indicated
that more than 83% of their survey respondents stated that they provided
investment education to participants.
124
However, many employers have not been satisfied with their
investment education programs. In a survey by ICC Plan Solutions, an
investment education provider, only 11.9% of plan sponsors said they were
119. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (1996).
120. Id.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2000).
122. Id.
123. Press Release, Hewitt Assocs. LLC, U.S. Employers Remain Committed to 401(k)
Plans Despite Weak Economy (Sept. 3, 2003), http://was4.hewitt.com/hewitt/resource/
newsroom/pressrel/2003/09-03-03.htm. (Hewitt researched nearly five hundred large
employers nationwide, which included more than three million employees.).
124. Fred Schneyer, Lipper: Lifecycle Funds Explode in Popularity,
PLANSPONSOR.coM, Mar. 14, 2005, http://www.plansponsor.com/pitypel0/?RECORD_
ID=28716 (citing Lipper Research Services, Lifecycle Funds: Fit for Life).
DO-IT-YOURSELF RETIREMENT
satisfied with their current programs. 121
2. Investment Advice
Some employers have elected to provide participants with investment
advice as well as investment education. According to PLANSPONSOR's
Eighth Annual Defined Contribution Services Survey (2004), 49% of the
employers that responded offer investment advice to participants. 2 6 That
reflects an increase from 43% of respondents in 2003 and 37% of
respondents in 2002.127 Similarly, the Deloitte Consulting 2004 Annual
401(k) Benchmarking Survey found that 40% of employers provided
investment advice to some or all participants. 2  The survey found that
approximately 14% of the participants in the respondents' plans used
investment advice services and around 34% of those participants acted
upon the recommendations.
1 29
The providing of investment advice corresponds with participant
demand. According to a survey by CIGNA Retirement and Investment
Services, 89% of 401(k) participants want "specific information on
investment decision-making., 130  A 2004 survey by MetLife found that
43% of participants wanted the assistance of a financial planner for
deciding how to invest their 401 (k) accounts.'
3
1
125. Amone, supra note 87, at 8.
126. Nevin Adams, Advice Offerings Expand in 2004, PLANSPONSOR.cOM, Dec. 9,
2004, http://www.plansponsor.com/pitypelO/?RECORDID=27723 (according to
PLANSPONSOR's Eighth Annual Defined Contribution Services Survey). See also Press
Release, Soc'y for Human Res. Mgmt., Survey Finds Nearly Half of All Employers Offer
Retirement Investment Advice (July 29, 2004), http://www.401khelpcenter.com/press_
2004/pr ebri_072904.html. (Employer-Sponsored Investment Advice Survey Report,
sponsored jointly by the Society for Human Resources Management (SHRM),
WorldatWork, and the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) found that "49 percent
of respondents said their organizations offer some kind of investment advice to their defined
contribution retirement plan participants.")
127. Adams, Advice Offerings Expand in 2004, supra note 126.
128. 2004 Annual 401(k) Benchmarking Survey (Deloitte Consulting LLP, Wilton,
Conn.), Apr. 2005, at 24, available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/
Annual_401kBenchmarkingSurvey_2004%281%29.pdf. See also Press Release, Ass'n
for Fin. Prof Is, Large U.S. Pension Funds Ease Restrictions on Company Stock and Offer
More Advice for Participants (Jun. 26, 2003), http://www.afponline.org/pub/pr/2003/pr03cie
ba dcsrvy.html (indicating that "[m]ore than 40% of survey respondents indicated that they
offer some type of investment advice to their DC plan participants.").
129. 2004 Annual 401(k) Benchmarking Survey, supra note 128, at 24.
130. Assistant Sec'y Ann L. Combs, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Employer-
Employee Relations, Committee on Education and the Workforce (Feb. 13, 2003) (transcript
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/ty021303.html).
131. THE METLIFE STUDY OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS TRENDS: FINDINGS FROM THE 2004
NATIONAL SURVEY OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 2 (2004), available at
http://www.metlife.com/Applications/Corporate/WPS/CDA/PageGenerator/0,1 674,P558,00.
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Under ERISA, a person who provides investment advice to a plan or
its participants for a fee is a fiduciary. 132 Section 404(c) of ERISA relieves
a fiduciary of liability for losses that result from participants' exercise of
independent control over their accounts.133 The DOL has indicated that
[I]n the context of an ERISA section 404(c) plan . . . the
designation of a fiduciary to provide investment advice to
participants . . .would [not], in itself, give rise to fiduciary
liability for loss, or with respect to any [fiduciary] breach ... that
is the direct and necessary result of a participant's ... exercise of
independent control. 
1 4
However, employers who select other fiduciaries, such as investment
advisors, are required to prudently select and monitor them. The DOL has
stated that a fiduciary is required to prudently monitor an appointed
fiduciary at reasonable intervals in "such manner as may be reasonably
expected to ensure that their performance has been in compliance with the
terms of the plan and statutory standards, and satisfies the needs of the
plan.
,, 35
In spite of the DOL's guidance, potential liability was identified by
35% of employers who participated in the Deloitte Consulting 2004 Annual
401(k) Benchmarking Survey as the primary reason that they did not
provide investment advice to participants. 136 Other reasons identified were
cost, by 24% of respondents, and lack of employee demand, by 16% of
respondents. 137
A significant factor in the providing of investment advice is cost. If
the goal of an investment advisor is to increase participants' rates of return
on their investments, any increased return should be netted against the cost
to the participant for the advisor. The Employer-Sponsored Investment
Advice Survey Report found that 53% of the respondents indicated that
investment advice is provided to participants free of charge. 38 Twenty-
three percent of respondents indicated that the employer paid for it, while
html (follow "2004 MetLife Study of Employee Benefits Trends" hyperlink).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 3(21) (2002).
133. See 29 U.S.C. § 404 (c); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(c)(1) (1997) (stating that
regulations on an employer's relief from fiduciary obligations apply only with respect to
transactions where a participant exercised independent control over the participant's
individual account).
134. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (1996).
135. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1975).
136. 2004 Annual 401(k) Benchmarking Survey, supra note 128, at 25.
137. Id.
138. Survey Finds Nearly Half of All Employers Offer Retirement Investment Advice,
supra note 126 (reporting on Employer-Sponsored Investment Advice Survey Report,
sponsored jointly by the Society for Human Resources Management (SHRM),
WorldatWork, and the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI)).
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8% stated that participants paid for it.139
The limited data analyzing the effectiveness of investment advice
reflected a modest change in asset allocations after advice was provided. A
study by Ernst & Young LLP and ExecuNet found that plans that provided
financial counseling reflected an increase of up to 11% in the change in
allocations in excess of 5% of the participant's account. 140 Similarly, a
2002 survey by the International Society of Certified Employee Benefit
Specialists found that 18% of participants changed their asset allocations
after using online advice services. 141 However, 70% of employers were not
aware of the impact of the investment advice.
142
PLANSPONSOR's Eighth Annual Defined Contribution Services
Survey (2004) indicated that "[d]espite the expanding availability of
financial guidance, participants were still inclined to over-invest in
company stock, by most standard measures."
'1 43
Based on the available information, it is not clear that investment
advice is an effective means of increasing participants' rates of return.
3. Life Cycle Funds
Employers are also utilizing life cycle funds to assist participants with
directing the investment of their accounts. Life cycle funds provide
participants with the ability to select an investment that is designed to
achieve specific investment objectives. Some life cycle funds focus on
levels of risk tolerance, offering conservative, moderate and aggressive
portfolios. Others focus on target retirement dates. These typically provide
for greater risk the longer the time frame before the target retirement date,
becoming more conservative as that date approaches. Conceptually, life
cycle funds are intended to manage the allocation of a participant's entire
account balance for them.
Life cycle funds are increasing in popularity among employers. A
report from Lipper Research Services indicated that there were more than
244 life cycle funds at the end of 2004.144 These funds held approximately
$139 billion in assets. This reflected an increase of 38% from the end of
2003, when there were 205 funds with $101 billion in assets. 145 Fidelity
Investments found that life cycle funds "were the most rapidly adopted
139. Id.
140. Press Release, Ernst & Young LLP, Financial Counseling Critical Component of
Retirement Planning; Education Not Sufficient (Nov. 18, 2004),
http://www.401khelpcenter.com/ press 2004/pr ey_l 11804.html.
141. AMERIKSETAL.,supranote 81, at 10-11.
142. Id.
143. Adams, supra note 126.
144. Schneyer, supra note 124.
145. Id.
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automatic plan feature during 2004, with approximately 1,200 employers
going in that direction."'146 Fidelity's analysis revealed that 75% of the
plans that used Fidelity offered at least one life cycle fund, and 6% of plans
selected a life cycle fund as their default investment option.
1 47
However, the Compass Institute has asserted that life cycle funds will
not generate sufficient returns net of expenses to justify their use. 48 The
Compass Institute's survey found that most companies' existing plans
could yield an eleven percent rate of return with extremely low risk, while
life cycle funds are unlikely to be able to reach that rate of return with
comparable risk. 
49
Thus, life cycle funds provide the advantage of having a professional
manage the accounts of participants who do not want to actively direct their
investments. However, it is unclear whether the costs for these services
outweigh the benefits.
C. Rates of Return for Participant-Directed Accounts
There are conflicting studies on the effects of participants' investment
choices.
Studies have shown that participants who direct their accounts have
lower investment returns than institutional investors. One study reflected
that investment returns by defined contribution plan participants were two
percent lower per year than the returns achieved by institutional
investors. 5 ° This could result in a difference in retirement savings of
nearly three-quarters of a million dollars.' 5 '
A study comparing defined benefit plans and 401(k) plans reflected
that the performance of 401 (k) plans compared to defined benefit plans has
varied depending on the time frame considered. The study examined the
Form 5500, Annual Return/Report for Employee Benefit Plan filings for
companies that sponsored one defined benefit plan and one 401(k) plan. 52
146. Fred Schneyer, Fidelity: Life Cycle Funds, Automatic Plan Programs Gaining
Popularity, PLANSPONSOR.coM, Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.plansponsor.com/
pitype 10/?RECORDID=28105 (analyzing 12,806 employer-sponsored retirement plans
Fidelity administers, representing nearly eleven million participants).
147. Id.
148. Fred Schneyer, Study: Plans Need 11% Average Annual Return,
PLANSPONSOR.COM, Sept. 20, 2004, available at http://www.plansponsor.coml
pi-type 10/?RECORDID=26766.
149. Id.
150. Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan Participants, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 88 (2002) (citing Barclays Global Investors, Mind the Gap! Why DC
Plans Underperform DB Plans, and How to Fix Them, INVESTMENT INSIGHTS, Apr. 2000, at
1).
151. Id. n.70.
152. Defined Benefit vs. 401(k) Returns: The Surprising Results, INSIDER, Jan. 2002,
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The study was structured in this manner in order to eliminate any effects of
company or employee characteristics. 153  The difference between the
median returns for each type of plan varied from year to year. 5 4  For
example, from 2000 to 2002, defined benefit plans significantly
outperformed 401(k) plans. 55 In 2000, 401(k) plans lost an average of
4.28%, while defined benefit plans had relatively no gain or loss.15 6 In
2001, 401(k) plans lost an average of 7.30%, while defined benefit plans
only lost an average of 3.82%. 1 7 Again in 2002, 401(k) plans did worse
than defined benefit plans, losing 12.26% compared to 8.43%,
respectively. 5 8 However, an average of the median returns from 1990
through 1998 reflect that defined benefit plans' returns were only 0.7%
higher than the returns for 401(k) plans. 59 One of the reasons for the
slightly higher returns for the defined benefit plans may be that the
participants in the 401(k) plans selected investments with greater risk since
they had a guaranteed benefit in the defined benefit plan.
The study examining the Form 5500 filings appears to indicate that
participants, on average, approximated the returns received by defined
benefit plans, which typically hire professional investment managers.
These results imply that average participants are able to invest over long
periods of time nearly as well as professional investment managers.
Alternatively, the returns could be attributable to the professional
investment managers who manage the mutual funds in which many 401(k)
plans invest. Additional research should consider other types of
participants.
IV. EFFECT ON EMPLOYERS
Employers typically provide retirement benefits in order to obtain and
retain employees. Companies must consider the cost of providing benefits
with investment flexibility in achieving business objectives. To reduce
employer liability for investment risk while satisfying employee demand
available at http://www.watsonwyatt.com/us/pubs/insider/showarticle.asp?ArticlelD=
9378&Component-The+Insider (analyzing Form 5500 filing from 1995 through 1998 and
recalculating 1990 through 1995 by using previously unavailable data).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Kip McDaniel, DB Plans Outperformed 401(k)s in 2000-2002 Bear Market,
PLANSPONSOR.coM, Nov. 22, 2004, available at http://www.plansponsor.com/pitypel0/
?RECORD ID=27559 ("The data provided by Watson Wyatt... is based on the Form 5500
filings of over 2,000 publicly traded domestic companies. Companies that sponsored more
than one DB and/or 401 (k) plan were excluded from the survey.").
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Defined Benefit vs. 401(k) Returns: The Surprising Results, supra note 152.
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for investment flexibility, many employers allow participants to direct the
investment of their retirement plan accounts.
However, some employers may improperly evaluate the protection
afforded by ERISA section 404(c). As a result, employers may fail to
properly weigh the benefits of allowing participants to direct the
investment of their accounts against the potential risks. This is particularly
significant in light of experts' concerns regarding participants' ability to
effectively direct the investment of their accounts. In evaluating the level
of protection afforded by ERISA section 404(c), some employers may not
be: (i) considering the areas in which 404(c) protection is not available; (ii)
assessing their level of compliance with 404(c); (iii) understanding the
risks if their plans do not comply with 404(c); and (iv) factoring in the
potential litigation costs as a result of allowing participants to direct the
investment of their accounts.
Companies and their boards of directors and officers are often the
fiduciaries of the companies' retirement plans. Frequently, companies are
designated as named fiduciaries for their retirement plans. Their boards of
directors often designate persons, such as the company's officers, to
manage the retirement plans. Under these circumstances, the board and the
persons selected by the board are fiduciaries.1 60  As a result, potential
liability associated with allowing participants to direct the investment of
their accounts may affect companies as well as their boards of directors and
certain executives.
A. Fiduciaries' Responsibilities Not Covered by ERISA Section 404(c)
Fiduciaries' duties are described in ERISA section 404(a). They
include the requirement that fiduciaries discharge their duties regarding the
plan solely in the interest of participants and for the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to participants and paying reasonable administrative
expenses. Fiduciaries must also use the "care, skill, prudence and
160. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2002). The positions held by members of a company's board
of directors and officers do not automatically cause them to become fiduciaries. As the
DOL explains in Interpretive Bulletin 75-8:
[M]embers of the board of directors of an employer which maintains an
employee benefit plan will be fiduciaries only to the extent that they have
responsibility for the functions described in section 3(21)(A) of the Act. For
example, the board of directors may be responsible for the selection and
retention of plan fiduciaries. In such a case, members of the board of directors
exercise "discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management of such plan" and are, therefore, fiduciaries with respect to the
plan.
29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-4 (1975).
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diligence" 161 that a prudent person would use and diversify the plan's
investments. Furthermore, fiduciaries must act in accordance with the
plan's documents, unless they conflict with ERISA.
ERISA section 404(c) only provides that fiduciaries will not be liable
for losses that result from the participants' allocation of their accounts
among the investment options offered by the plan. As a result, all of the
fiduciaries' duties, other than investing the plan assets handled by
participants, continue to apply. Some fiduciaries misunderstand the
manner in which ERISA section 404(c) operates and fail to recognize that
they continue to be responsible for prudently selecting and monitoring the
investment options offered to participants and for investing the accounts of
participants who do not affirmatively direct the investment of their
accounts.
1. Fiduciaries Remain Responsible for Prudently Selecting and
Monitoring Investments
Plan fiduciaries are responsible for prudently selecting and monitoring
their plan's investments.1 62 ERISA section 404(c) provides that fiduciaries
will be relieved of liability for losses that result from a participant's
exercise of control over the participant's account. In the preamble to the
404(c) regulations, the DOL explains:
[T]he act of limiting or designating investment options which are
intended to constitute all or part of the investment universe of an
ERISA 404(c) plan is a fiduciary function . . . . [T]he plan
fiduciary has a fiduciary obligation to prudently select such
vehicles, as well as a residual fiduciary obligation to periodically
evaluate the performance of such vehicles to determine, based on
that evaluation, whether the vehicles should continue to be
available as participant investment options.
1 63
Additional DOL guidance reflects this position. In Advisory Opinion
No. 98-04(A), the DOL stated: "the act of designating investment
alternatives in an ERISA section 404(c) plan is a fiduciary function to
which the limitation on liability provided by section 404(c) is not
applicable."' 64 Similarly, in an information letter, the DOL indicated, "The
responsible plan fiduciaries are also subject to ERISA's general fiduciary
standards in initially choosing or continuing to designate investment
161. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1979).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
163. 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,924 n.27 (Oct. 13, 1992).
164. U.S. Dep't Of Labor PWBA Advisory Opinion 98-04A n.1 (May 28, 1998),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/programs/ori/advisory98/98-04a.htm (citation
omitted).
20061
378 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 8:2
alternatives offered by a 404(c) plan.',
165
The court in In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation166 ("Unisys F') took
a position that conflicted with the DOL's position. Unisys I involved
transactions that occurred prior to the issuance of the DOL's final
regulations. The court in Unisys I held that fiduciaries who breached their
duties regarding the investments offered by the plan could escape liability
if they could prove that the participants' losses were caused by their
exercise of control. The court stated:
There is nothing in section 1104(c) which suggests that a breach
on the part of a fiduciary bars it from asserting section 1 104(c)'s
application. On the contrary, the statute's unqualified instruction
that a fiduciary is excused from liability for "any loss" which
"results from [a] participant's or [a] beneficiary's exercise of
control" clearly indicates that a fiduciary may call upon section
1 104(c)'s protection where a causal nexus between a
participant's or a beneficiary's exercise of control and the
claimed loss is demonstrated. This requisite causal connection is,
in our view, established with proof that a participant's or a
beneficiary's control was a cause-in-fact, as well as a substantial
contributing factor in bringing about the loss incurred.
167
However, several courts since then have agreed with the DOL's
position. The court in Franklin v. First Union Corp.168 held that plan
fiduciaries are responsible for selecting and removing their plans'
investment options when the plans comply with ERISA section 404(c).
Similarly, the Court in In re Sprint Corporation ERISA Litigation
169
indicated that "the act of designating investment alternatives is a fiduciary
function regardless of a plan's purported § 404(c) status."' 7 ° The court in
In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litig.'71 explained that
"[f]osses that do not 'result from' the participant's exercise of control are
still charged against the plan fiduciary, which retains the duty to prudently
select investment options under the plan and to oversee their performance
on a continuing basis."'
' 72
Thus, fiduciaries are required to prudently select and monitor their
plans' investments, even if the plans comply with ERISA section 404(c).
In order to satisfy their fiduciary duties, they should engage in a prudent
165. DOL Information Letter, 1997 WL 1824017, at *2 (Nov. 26, 1997).
166. 74 F.3d 420 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 810 (1996).
167. Id. at 445 (footnote omitted).
168. 84 F. Supp. 2d 720, 732 (E.D. Va. 2000).
169. 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9622, at *6, dismissed by, in part, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19125 (D. Kan., Sept. 24, 2004).
170. Id.
171. 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 578 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
172. Id.
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process to regularly review the investments offered by the plan, determine
if each investment is suitable for the plan and its participants, and remove
any investment choices that do not satisfy their requirements.
2. Responsibility for Non-Participant Directed Accounts
Some employers are not aware that fiduciaries are responsible for
allocating plan assets among the selected investment choices unless
participants direct the investment of their accounts. 7 3 The Preamble to the
ERISA section 404(c) regulation states, "[U]ntil a participant or beneficiary
exercises control with respect to assets contributed on his behalf, plan
fiduciaries are subject to all of the fiduciary duties and obligations set forth
in ... ERISA with respect to such assets."' 7 4 The Preamble explains that
fiduciaries of 404(c) plans "have a duty to provide for the investment of
idle plan assets, and lack of participant direction will not absolve a
fiduciary from such duties."'
' 75
Many fiduciaries select one investment option in which they invest all
non-directed accounts, referred to as a default account. However, the use
of a default account does not relieve fiduciaries of the responsibility for
prudently investing those plan assets. The Preamble indicates, "[P]lan
provisions providing for investments in the absence of an affirmative
exercise of control may be followed only if the fiduciary determinations
[sic] that following such provisions would not violate his fiduciary duties,
including his duties under sections 404 and 406 of ERISA."'
17 6
Surveys have indicated that most fiduciaries select a short-term
investment option as a default account. The Deloitte Consulting 2004
Annual 401(k) Benchmarking Survey reflected that 58% of plans had a
short-term fund, such as stable value or money market funds, as their
default investment election for respondents with automatic enrollment.
77
The 45th Annual Survey of Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America
(PSCA) indicated that nearly 48% of the surveyed plans selected either the
stable value or money market funds as their default option for automatic
enrollment plans. 1
78
173. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2002).
174. 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,907 (Oct. 13, 1992).
175. Id. at 46,923.
176. Id.
177. Deloitte Consulting 2004 Annual 401(k) Benchmarking Survey, supra note 128, at
7. See also Large U.S. Pension Funds Ease Restrictions on Company Stock and Offer More
Advice for Participants, CIEBA Defined Contribution Survey (Jun. 26, 2003) ("[M]ore than
40% of survey respondents indicated that they offer some type of investment advice to their
DC plan participants.").
178. 45th Annual Survey (Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, Chicago, IL)
(2002) (reflecting 2001 plan year data).
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The DOL Regulations to ERISA section 404(a) provide that
fiduciaries should consider the investments' anticipated return in light of
the funding objectives. 17 9  Arguably, short-term investments are not
consistent with long-term funding objectives, such as the goals for
investing for retirement purposes. Agnew and Szykman indicated that they
did not consider the default investment to be appropriate for many
participants. 8 °  They found that these investments are usually very
conservative, not tailored to the participant's needs and frequently result in
insufficient retirement benefits for the participant. 8 '
Thus, fiduciaries are required to invest the accounts of participants
who do not direct the investment of their accounts in a manner that is
suitable for retirement investing. Based on the available research, it does
not appear as though conservative, short-term investments would satisfy
this requirement.
B. Assessing Compliance with ERISA Section 404(c)
In evaluating the benefits and risks of allowing participants to direct
their investments, many employers mistakenly assume that their plans
comply with ERISA section 404(c). 8 2 Additionally, there are ambiguities
in the regulation to section 404(c) that could result in plans' non-
compliance. If a plan does not comply with ERISA section 404(c),
fiduciaries would not be able to rely on its protection to relieve them from
losses attributable to participants' investment directions.
1. Non-compliance with Regulation
Several practitioners have identified common areas of non-compliance
with ERISA section 404(c). These include the failure to provide
participants with: (i) the identity and contact information of the 404(c)
fiduciary; (ii) prospectuses immediately before or after participants' initial
investments in particular options; (iii) a notice that the plan intends to
comply with section 404(c); and (iv) a description of the additional
information the participants may request.'83
179. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1979).
180. Agnew & Szykman, supra note 93, at 3.
181. Id.
182. See Deloitte Consulting 2004 Annual 401(k) Benchmarking Survey, supra note 128,
at 21 (indicating in Exhibit 89 that 93% of respondents notified participants that their plans
intended to comply with ERISA section 404(c)).
183. Fred Reish & Joe Faucher, Enron, 404(c) and the Personal Liability of Corporate
Officers, JOURNAL OF PENSION BENEFITS, Winter 2003, at 102; Kathleen Sheil Scheidt &
David L. Wolfe, Prudence and Diversification Revisited-ERISA Section 404(c) Protection
in the Wake of Enron, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS JOURNAL, March 2003, at 23, 28.
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In one of the few cases that involved ERISA section 404(c) and
transactions that took place after the issuance of the final regulations to
ERISA section 404(c), the court found that the employer had failed to
provide sufficient evidence that it had satisfied the requirements of the
section. In In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation,
the court noted that Enron had not demonstrated that it had provided
participants with an explanation that the plan intended to satisfy 404(c) or
notification that if the plan satisfied ERISA section 404(c), the fiduciaries
would be relieved of liability.
8 4
As a result, some employers may improperly be relying on the
protection afforded them under section 404(c) when their plans do not
strictly comply with 404(c) requirements. This reliance may subject
employers to unanticipated liability.
2. Ambiguities in ERISA Section 404(c)
Although the regulation affecting ERISA section 404(c) provides
considerable details regarding its requirements, the section remains
somewhat ambiguous. It is possible that a court could interpret its
provisions differently than fiduciaries. Examples of potential ambiguities
include the types of information to be provided to participants and
prospectus delivery requirements.
The regulation indicates that ERISA section 404(c) protection is only
available if a "participant or beneficiary is provided or has the opportunity
to obtain sufficient information to make informed decisions with regard to
investment alternatives available under the plan, and incidents of
ownership appurtenant to such investments."' 85 The regulation identifies
requirements that must be satisfied in order to comply with this provision;
however, it also implies that the detailed requirements do not represent all
of the information that must be provided. Thus, plan fiduciaries do not
have definitive guidelines to follow in order to ensure they satisfy this
provision of the regulation.
Additionally, the regulation provides that ERISA section 404(c)
protection is only available if "[i]n the case of an investment alternative
which is subject to the Securities Act of 1933, and in which the participant
or beneficiary has no assets invested, immediately [preceding or] following
the participant's or beneficiary's initial investment, a copy of the most
recent prospectus provided to the plan" 186 is provided to the participant or
beneficiary. The regulation is unclear as to what time frame "immediately"
184. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 575 (S.D.
Tex. 2003).
185. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(B) (1993).
186. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(B)(i)(viii) (1993).
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refers to. As a result, plans may be deemed to have failed to deliver
prospectuses in accordance with the regulation, when, in fact, they have not
failed.
While some may find these issues to be mere subtleties of the law, it is
possible that under certain circumstances, a plan that considers itself to
satisfy ERISA section 404(c) will not.
C. Fiduciary Responsibility for Participants' Investment Choices When
ERISA Section 404(c) Is Not Available
ERISA section 404(c) provides that fiduciaries are relieved of liability
from losses resulting from participants' direction of the investment of their
accounts. Fiduciaries are not, however, relieved of liability if their plans do
not comply with section 404(c). This does not necessarily mean that the
fiduciaries would be liable for losses resulting from participants'
investment directions.
ERISA section 404(c) provides that participants shall not be deemed
fiduciaries as a result of directing the investment of their accounts. As a
result, participants who direct the investment of their accounts could
arguably be fiduciaries if the plan does not comply with section 404(c), as a
person who exercises discretionary control over a plan's assets is a
fiduciary of that plan. 187  As fiduciaries, they could potentially be
responsible for prudently investing their accounts. 188 This seems fairly
unlikely, as it would seem to obviate the need for ERISA section 404(c).
Fiduciaries are liable for breaches of fiduciary duties by a co-fiduciary
under certain circumstances. 89 A fiduciary may be liable if the fiduciary:
(i) knowingly participates in or conceals the act or omission of another
fiduciary; (ii) enables another fiduciary to commit a breach as a result of
his failure to comply with the fiduciary duties; or (iii) knows about the co-
fiduciary's breach and fails to make reasonable efforts to remedy it.' 90 As a
result, even if participants were considered fiduciaries, the named
fiduciaries would also be liable as co-fiduciaries. 19'
187. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2002).
188. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). They would not be responsible for the investment of any other
participants' account or the plan itself, as their fiduciary responsibility is limited to the
extent they have responsibility for the actions described in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 29
C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-4 (1993).
189. See 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (listing "[c]ircumstances giving rise to liability").
190. Id.
191. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, FR-14 (indicating circumstances in which named
fiduciaries would be liable as co-fiduciaries). See generally Varity Corp v. Howe, 516 U.S.
489 (1996); Curtiss Wright Corp v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995); Lockheed Corp v.
Spink, 517 U.S. 882 (1996). However, at a meeting between the American Bar Association
and the DOL, the representatives from the DOL stated, "A plan cannot side-step the
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D. Litigation Expenses
Although ERISA section 404(c) may relieve fiduciaries of liability for
losses resulting from participants' direction of the investment of their
accounts, they may incur considerable expenses to defend themselves in
such litigation. Since ERISA section 404(c) is based on the actions
required to be taken by the plan and its fiduciaries, discovery in these cases
can be substantial. The court in In re AEP ERISA Litigation explained:
"The determination of whether an ERISA plan is an individual account
plan is fact-intensive." '1 92 The court indicated that courts need to examine
whether participants were given sufficient information about the risks and
consequences of the investment options, their rights and the fiduciaries'
obligations, as well as the ability to change their investment allocations.
As a result, motions to dismiss are frequently not granted. The court
in In re AEP ERISA Litigation indicated "courts routinely refuse to dismiss
an ERISA action because the defendant argues section 404(c) applies."' 93
A similar position was taken in Rankin v. Rots,194 which stated, "Whether
or not section 404(c) applies is not a question on a motion to dismiss.
Section 404(c) provides defendants with a defense to liability; it does not
mean that [the plaintiff] has failed to make out a claim against them."
In litigation involving ERISA section 404(c), the fiduciaries have the
burden of proving they can rely on the protection afforded by 404(c). The
court in In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation
explained, "Because § 404(c) in essence exempts a fiduciary from liability
that he normally would have under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), the fiduciary
seeking protection under § 404(c), and not the plaintiff, has the burden of
demonstrating that it applies." 9
requirements of section 404(c) by taking the position that a participant who exercises
investment discretion over his or her accounts is a plan 'fiduciary."' Fred Reish and Joe
Faucher, ERISA Section 404(c)-How Does It Really Work, and What Does It Matter?,
JOURNAL OF PENSION BENEFITS, Autumn 2002, at 55.
192. In re AEP ERISA Litigation, 327 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815 (S.D. Ohio 2004). See also
In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 578-79 (noting the
kinds of evidence that must be produced in evaluating whether or not a plan qualified as a
404(c) plan).
193. In re AEP ERISA Litigation, 327 F. Supp. 2d 812, 829 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
194. Rankin v. Rots, 278 F. Supp. 2d 853, 872 (E.D. Mich. 2003). See also Vivien v.
Worldcom Inc., No. C 02-01329 WHA, 2002 WL 31640557 at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2002)
(stating that a statutory bar to liability does not warrant a motion to dismiss at early stages of
litigation).
195. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
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E. Conclusion
The consequences to employers of allowing participants to direct the
investment of their accounts is unclear. There is the potential for
significant liability to employers if participants do not properly invest their
accounts. Given the uncertainty surrounding ERISA section 404(c),
employers may be placing too much reliance on the potential protection of
ERISA section 404(c).
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR MAKING THE SYSTEM WORK BETTER
A. Disclosure to Workers and Guidance to Fiduciaries
Under the current system, workers do not have to be notified that they
are not required to direct the investment of their defined contribution plan
accounts. In fact, many forms for electing deferrals request that
participants indicate the manner in which they want their accounts invested.
It is unclear to what extent workers would be notified that they are not
required to direct the investment of personal accounts under the proposed
changes to the Social Security system.
Additionally, fiduciaries are given fairly vague guidance about the
manner in which retirement plans should be invested. ERISA's prudence
requirements set forth general principles regarding the investment of plan
assets, but do not provide specific guidance regarding the manner in which
a fiduciary should do so.
Notifying workers that they may elect to make deferrals without
selecting the investment of their accounts for both retirement plans and
Social Security personal accounts may be beneficial for workers and
society. As a result of notification, fewer workers who were not willing to
understand the principles of investing would direct the investment of their
accounts.
Guidance regarding notification requirements could be combined with
a safe harbor for fiduciaries that they can use to invest the accounts of
participants who do not want to allocate the investment of their plan assets.
In this way, plans could provide for a reasonable rate of return for
retirement purposes without, or with a reduced, fear of litigation from
participants and the Department of Labor.
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B. Analyzing the Effect of Individual Direction of Investments and the
Effectiveness of Tools to Assist Workers
The available studies do not clearly indicate whether participants
receive lower long-term rates of return than professional investors. The
ability to invest in mutual funds may account for this problem. As a result,
additional research should be done to determine whether the effect of long-
term retirement investing by individuals results in lower retirement savings.
Furthermore, the effects of the tools available to assist individuals
with investing on investment returns are not clear. It is not clear whether
tools such as investment education, investment advice and life cycle funds
are effective for increasing the rate of return. In order to determine
whether these tools should be encouraged or even required, additional
research must be done to determine the extent to which participants' rates
of return increase with their use.
C. Provide an ERISA Section 404(c) Safe Harbor to Reduce Litigation
Costs
ERISA section 404(c) is currently of limited value to employers.
Even if fiduciaries believe they are complying with all of ERISA section
404(c)'s requirements, they may still be subject to significant litigation
expenses defending an allegation that the plan did not comply.
Additionally, a court may find that they did not comply as a result of the
ambiguities in the regulations.
These issues could be significantly reduced if the DOL issued a safe
harbor for plans that allow participant direction of the investments of their
accounts. The ERISA section 404(c) regulation could be revised to provide
for a safe harbor that, if met, would enable the fiduciary for the plan to
automatically satisfy ERISA section 404(c). The safe harbor could be
based on the principles of the current regulation and would apply if
participants were only allowed to invest in diversified investment vehicles
such as mutual funds. Investment choices could be limited to a moderate
number of funds that provide for basic diversification with limited risk.
The disclosure requirements could be deemed satisfied if certain notices
were handled in a manner consistent with the distribution of other required
disclosures, such as summary plan descriptions, and under certain
circumstances, blackout period notices and notices pursuant to ERISA
section 204(h). The safe harbor could only be effective with respect to
those participants who affirmatively made investment choices.
Additionally, the safe harbor could only be effective to the extent the plan
fiduciary prudently selected and monitored the investment performance of
the funds being offered. Fiduciaries could demonstrate compliance with
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this requirement by providing evidence of meetings discussing the plan's
investments, such as committee minutes. Additionally, fiduciaries would
need to provide documentation that reflected that the investments offered
by the plan were independently rated to be in the middle or upper rankings
of the investments in their class.
The use of a safe harbor would allow the benefits of ERISA section
404(c) to be maintained, while more effectively providing the protection
intended by ERISA section 404(c) for fiduciaries.
D. Conclusion
Participant-direction of retirement savings has been utilized for many
years. Additionally, many advocate allowing workers to self-direct a
portion of their retirement savings. However, we currently lack sufficient
information to determine how best to provide choices to workers without
unnecessarily increasing the risk that adequate retirement assets will not be
available to them. Given the inconsistencies in the studies that have been
performed, additional studies should be conducted to determine whether
workers, on average, are effective at directing the investment of their
accounts. The potential consequences are significant, given the amount of
the tax subsidy for retirement plans and the risks to the Social Security
system.
